Poland Investigates Possible African Swine Fever Act of Bioterrorism. Why Producers Can’t Let Their Guard Down

By Mark Beaven, Founder & President, EthoGuard

Former member, Canadian National Critical Infrastructure Committee

When most livestock and poultry producers think about on-farm risk they picture feed costs, weather, predators, or a routine disease outbreak. Few have agri-terrorism, the intentional introduction of a pathogen to animals or food — at the top of that list. That’s understandable: it’s rare. But rare doesn’t mean impossible, and the consequences of a deliberate introduction of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) like African swine fever (ASF) would be catastrophic for producers, rural economies, and national food security.

A recent alarm from Europe. Why it matters here.

In late coverage from Poland authorities reported an African swine fever–positive wild boar carcass that appears to have been deliberately dumped in a pig-producing region, an incident that Polish officials and press described as suspicious and that sparked concerns about intentional acts that amplify disease spread. Whether this specific event proves to be a criminal or malicious act, it underlines how a single contaminated carcass or piece of material placed deliberately can threaten nearby farms. (tvpworld.com)

ASF is highly contagious for swine, highly stable in the environment and in pork products, and can spread through very small amounts of contaminated material. The European Food Safety Authority and other monitoring bodies continue to report ASF activity in parts of Europe, with Poland accounting for a notable share of wild-boar cases, a reminder that FADs can persist regionally and be moved by human actions. (European Food Safety Authority)

Agri-terrorism is a real national security concern

This isn’t just a topic for foreign headlines: U.S. and Canadian homeland and agricultural security organizations explicitly treat the food-and-agriculture sector as a target of concern. U.S. Department of Homeland Security publications and programs identify threats to food and agriculture and the agency funds research, detection and defense programs aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to deliberate or accidental threats to the nation’s agricultural assets. Likewise, long-running U.S. federal analyses and testimony (including GAO reviews and Congressional hearings) have examined agro-terrorism as a plausible route to produce economic disruption and undermine public confidence. (Department of Homeland Security)

Canada likewise views critical infrastructure (including agriculture) through a national resilience lens. From my own experience, I used to sit on the Canadian National Critical Infrastructure Committee in Ottawa, bioterrorism and threats to agriculture were treated as serious topics at the committee table. That background is why I’m urging producers to treat biosecurity not as optional, but as essential national-level insurance.

Why producers often don’t think about it and why they should

There are practical reasons agro-terrorism is not front-of-mind for many producers:

• It’s rare compared with other farm risks, so there’s a human tendency to prioritize the frequent problems.

• Producers face countless day-to-day pressures (labour, markets, weather, pests); the abstract threat of a malicious actor is easy to deprioritize.

• Many producers assume governments will spot and stop intentional threats before they reach farms.

Those assumptions are risky. A determined actor or an opportunistic criminal can exploit routine gaps in on-farm protocols: a gate left unlocked, an open dumpster where contaminated material could be planted, lack of visitor screening, or weak separation between high-risk areas and production. The result would not only be illness in animals, it could trigger movement restrictions, depopulation orders, loss of market access, and enormous financial losses.

What a producer-level defense looks like (concrete steps)

Treat the possibility of intentional introduction the same way you treat accidental introduction: as another justification to tighten everyday biosecurity. Key, high-impact measures include:

• Strict Restricted Access Zone (RAZ) rules. Define the RAZ clearly around production spaces. Only essential personnel may enter; visitors must have prior approval and be escorted. Lock gates and control access points.

  

  
  

• Danish entry / controlled entry systems. Require clothing and footwear changes, handwashing/sanitizing and a physical barrier (e.g., shower, boot bath, or designated boot area) before entering production spaces. Document entries and exits.

  

  
  

• Visitor logs and credential checks. Know who is on your property and why. Validate service personnel and require them to follow your on-farm protocols.

  

  
  

• Manage off-farm material and waste. Don’t allow unknown or unvetted materials (e.g., carcasses, aggregates of meat products, suspect feed) to be left on or near your property. Secure dumpsters and refuse areas.

  
  

• Train staff to recognize and report suspicious activity. If someone dumps an animal, leaves suspicious packages, or photographs facilities in unusual ways, report it to law enforcement and your veterinary authorities immediately.

  
  

• Maintain perimeter surveillance and lighting. Cameras, signage and good lighting are deterrents and help investigators if something happens.

  
  

• Biosecurity culture and drills. Practice response plans, confirm PPE stock, and coordinate with your veterinarian and local authorities on reporting and response pathways.

  
  

These are the same practical protections that reduce the chance of accidental disease introduction. The difference is the mindset: treating your farm as a small piece of critical infrastructure that needs to be defended from all threats, accidental or deliberate.

What government agencies say and what that implies for producers

U.S. DHS materials and programs (including the Science & Technology efforts focused on food and agriculture defense) explicitly fund detection, response and protective capability development because the risk to food and agriculture has national implications not just farm-level ones. That official attention means producers need to be ready to cooperate with authorities and to meet regulatory response requirements in the event of a confirmed FAD, from quarantines to movement controls. (Department of Homeland Security)

Government reports and hearings (including Congressional attention in the U.S.) recognize that attacks on agriculture, whether intended to cause illness or to create economic disruption are plausible and damaging. That recognition flows into funding for surveillance, diagnostics, and farmer outreach, but it also means producers carry the first line of defense: practical on-farm actions. (Government Accountability Office)

Simple defenses, enormous upside

Agri-terrorism is unlikely compared with many day-to-day risks. But when it comes to highly infectious FADs such as ASF, a single deliberate act could amplify spread rapidly and trigger devastating controls. The good news is the same practical biosecurity investments that protect against accidental disease introductions also dramatically reduce vulnerability to deliberate ones.

If you run a farm, treat biosecurity like insurance: pay attention to access control, records, cleaning and disinfection protocols, and staff training. That small upfront investment lowers the chance of being the weak link in a system that feeds millions and it protects your business, your community, and national food security.